In an opinion today that will no doubt cause a Pandora’s Box to open in the family courts, the Texas Supreme Court held that “as agreed” possession orders are authorized, valid, and constitutional. Based on the broad and undefined standards of “good cause” and “best interest”, a possession order that gives one party unlimited and complete discretion over the other party’s access to the child is perfectly acceptable. Here’s some quotes from this sweeping opinion:

Read the case here: IN THE INTEREST OF J.J.R.S. AND L.J.R.S., CHILDREN

“While we understand the gravity of imposing a severe restriction or limitation on access to one’s children, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vesting the managing conservators with complete discretion over Mother’s access to the children.”  (Opinion at 7.)

“In other words, once a trial court determines that good cause exists for a nonspecific order, the only question left is whether the extent of the restriction or limitation under section 153.193 is in the best interest of the child.” (Opinion at 10.)

“Mother next argues that if a total denial of access serves the children’s best interest, the trial court must terminate the parent-child relationship instead of creating a possessory conservatorship that amounts to an effective denial of access. Again, the trial court’s order was not a denial of access [because she could seek to modify in the future].” (Opinion at 15.)

“Whether a set of broad, enforceable guidelines is preferable to an order granting discretion to the managing conservators requires a case-by-case determination of the child’s best interest.” (Opinion at 15.)

“Thus, while an order must be ‘clear, specific, and unambiguous’ to be enforceable by contempt, it does not follow that every order less than that is invalid.” (Opinion at 18.)

“…[T]he Code does not require – nor have we ever held – that trial courts must issue orders that are always enforceable by contempt.” (Opinion at 18.)

So the questions to the family lawyers out there: Does this effectively reverse Slavin’s requirement of specificity? Or at least put Slavin on the bench warming the seat? And, will this give trial court’s even more discretion to do whatever they want with out any boundaries whatsoever?