'Til death do us part, or until I sue you.

On July 8, 2009, the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for monetary damages in favor of one spouse against the other.  In Colvin v. Colvin, the husband sued his wife for personal injury damages caused by his wife in an automobile collision.  Wife was the driver of a car and the husband was the passenger.  Wife and a third party were in a collision, third party sued wife, and then husband intervened in the lawsuit and sued third party and wife (husband and wife were married at the time and are still so). 

The trial court awarded damages to husband against wife, and wife appealed.  On appeal, the Tyler Court Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.  Interestingly, the Colvin opinion does not mention whether or not husband and wife are still married. 

The Colvin opinion presents an interesting situation.  Under Texas law, community property is divided into two types: (1) joint management; and (2) sole management.  The community property characterization is important because if one spouse is held liable for a tort (i.e. negligence) during marriage, then the court may satisfy the judgment by looking to the community property jointly managed by the spouses as well as the sole management community property of the non-culpable spouse.  In result in Colvin is that in a sense the trial court could look to the community property jointly managed by the husband and wife, and the husband's sole management community property, to satisfy the judgment.  

As a Dallas divorce lawyer, our clients frequenltly are unaware of the concepts of joint and sole management community property.  In a nutshell, if either spouse is held liable for tortious conduct during marriage, then all property other than the non-culpable spouse's separate property may be used to satisfy the judgment. 

No Debtors Prison for Failing to Make Car Payment

A new case out of the Tyler Court of Appeals hold that a contempt order ordering imprisonment for failure to make car payments required by a divorce decree is void as imprisonment for debt. Also, the court holds that  a contempt order may not be used to make substantive changes to divorce decree. In re White, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 WL 1153396 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, orig. proceeding) (4/30/09)

Facts: Father and mother divorced on 12/29/05. Trial court appointed both JMC but gave father exclusive right to choose child’s primary residence. Trial court required both parties to give 60 days’ notice of intended residence change and father to make payments on wife’s car. Trial court ordered that the father make child available at his residence for mother to pick up. In 2006, mother filed a motion for enforcement. Trial court found that father had fraudulently notified mother that he was moving, had not surrendered child to mother at court-scheduled times and had failed to make car payments. Trial court held father in contempt and ordered him confined for 30 days. It suspended based on father paying attorney’s fees and mother’s loss resulting from repossession of car. It also required that the delivery of the child be limited to Anderson County. Father paid funds into trial court’s registry and petitioned for mandamus for district court to vacate contempt finding.

Held: Mandamus granted as to the car payments and methods of access to child and denied for the other findings of contempt.

Tyler Court of Appeals Opinion: A court cannot order confinement on the basis of a debt. The car payments are part of a division of property; they are not assets held in trust. Therefore, the obligation to make payments is a debt even though a divorce decree created it. Since it is not enforceable by confinement, the trial court abused its discretion in the contempt order. The only way to make substantive changes to a divorce decree is under TFC §156.001. As limiting delivery to Anderson County was a substantive change, trial court abused its discretion in its probation order. The contempt finding for husband fraudulently claiming a change of address was justified.

Any Dallas family law attorney knows that our country was formed based on the concept that a party could not be imprisoned for failure to pay a debt. We do not have debtor's prison in America! Just because a debt obligation is listed in a divorce decree makes it no less a debt. Family law attorneys should counsel their clients about the seeming lack of enforceability of the division of debts and structure the settlement of the estate in such a way that protects the enforceability of the court’s orders. For example, if the decree had left the car payment as wife’s obligation and ordered husband to pay maintenance in the amount of the car payment to wife, the wife would have had better enforceability options. Or, the car payment could have been awarded as additional child support. But, simply putting a debt pay-ment in the division of assets is insufficient to protect the client on whose behalf the payment is to be made.

This commentary originally appeared in the June 2009 Section Report of the State Bar of Texas Family Law section, where I serve as guest editor.